In most practical applications, for the sake of information integrity not only it is useful to detect whether a multimedia content has been modified or not, but also to identify which kind of attack has been carried out. In the case of audio streams, for example, it may be useful to localize the tamper in the time and/or frequency domain. In this paper we devise a hash-based tampering detection and localization system exploiting compressive sensing principles. The multimedia content provider produces a small hash signature using a limited number of random projections of a time-frequency representation of the original audio stream. At the content user side, the hash signature is used to estimate the distortion between the original and the received stream and, provided that the tamper is sufficiently sparse or sparsifiable in some orthonormal basis expansion or redundant dictionary (e.g. DCT or wavelet), to identify the time-frequency portion of the stream that has been manipulated. In order to keep the hash length small, the algorithm exploits distributed source coding techniques.

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